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The allocation of power among central, intermediate, and dispersed
governmental units is an unavoidably recurrent constitutional and political
problem. After a constitutive political act has determined the basic
allocation and denial of powers, the established structure of government
provides a framework for the exercise of power.
t 
Within that framework,
the margins are subject to cycles of adjustment through the vocabulary of
federalism, states rights, and home rule.' When the structure is sound,
political activity will swirl around issues and outcomes while scholarly
analysis will focus on process. In a defective system, a major subject of
controversy will be the need for basic organizational reform. Scholarly
analysis in such a system will be concerned with structure. For example,
in post-revolutionary America, the inadequacy of the Articles of Confeder-
ation led to The Federalist Papers and to the Constitutional Convention,
which celebrated its bicentennial in 1987. Currently, the Soviet Union is
engaged in a drastic restructuring, which disrupts the formulation and
implementation of policy.
At the international level, how much should we be concerned with
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process and how much with structure? To what extent is the global system
sound, and to what extent does it require radical revision? An analysis of
the nature of international law can help to answer these questions. This
Article concludes that the general structure of international law is stable
and sound, reflecting and serving the dominance of the nation-state system.
That system, however, is undergoing a modification, which creates an
opportunity for constitutional change in the area of human rights.
On the spectrum of centralization and decentralization, international
law is a halfway house between primitive law and modem law. The
primary distinction between a primitive legal system and a modem national
system is in the degree of centralization. In western society, we find a
highly centralized legal system in all of the three major jural functions:
legislation, adjudication, and enforcement. Lawmaking in a modem society
is centralized; laws are made by a legislature. There are constitutional and
other established procedures for electing its members and for passing laws.
The law is found in a code and in the cases that interpret it. Adjudication
in a modem system is also centralized. In an age characterized by
specialization and professionalization, the designated jurist wears a robe,
sits in a courtroom, and does nothing else but judge. Finally, in an
advanced legal system, we find centralized enforcement. We are able to
identify a marshall, sheriff, policeman, or other armed forces, whose job,
in part, is to enforce court decisions. There is a monopoly of legitimate
coercive force in a centralized legal system.
3
II. PRIMITIVE LAW
Primitive legal systems are characterized by decentralization in the
legislative, adjudicative, and police functions. First, with regard to the
legislative function, primitive law has no central lawmaking body.
Primitive societies have sets of rules, but such rules are merely a form of
customary law.
4 The rules have matured over time, with the result that no
one can remember when they were formulated. Second, the primitive legal
system is decentralized in its adjudicative function. This is difficult to
conceptualize; in fact, it is almost impossible to think of a legal system that
has not devised at least some central adjudicative body.
5 
Last, primitive
legal systems are characterized by a decentralized police function. There
3. See H. KELSEN, supra note 1, at 33. But cf. H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 213.
4. H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 89.
5. As we shall see, international law has a decentralized adjudicative function. See infta
note 24 and accompanying text.
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is no particular policeman, sheriff, bailiff, ruler, or chief-the society as a
whole enforces its own laws, which have been inherited. As Karl
Llewellyn put it in The Cheyenne Way: "What distinguishes primitive from
developed law [is] the range and clarity of available administrative
machinery. ,6
Imagine a rudimentary economy, a primitive society perhaps on a
remote island in the South Pacific, where the rules that govern the people
have been followed by them for as long as anyone can remember. Assume
that there is a rule that states: "Thou shalt not tread on thy neighbor's yam
patch." No one knows where this rule came from, but one can easily see
the salutary purpose it serves in the society; that is, people should walk on
paths and not spoil the growth of the yam by lazy habits of cutting
corners.
7
From time to time, someone would walk across someone else's yam
patch. This may go undetected, in which case the law may not be
enforced.
8 At other times, the trespasser would be detected, and a subtle
process of adjudication would commence from which the word would get
around that so-and-so had walked on someone else's yam patch. This
would culminate in an informal but definitive judgment that the law had
been transgressed. Eventually, the individual would know that the peers
in the community had decided that the law had been violated, and, equally
important, the culprit would realize that he or she had done something
unlawful. Finally, the punishment would be imposed. It could be, for
example, ostracism-simply a short-term banishment. The trespasser
would go off into some comer of the island and stay out of everyone's
way for awhile. Thus, the enforcement process is also decentralized.
III. ANCIENT ICELAND
International law lies between the decentralization of pristine legal
systems and the centralization of modem legal systems. Before discussing
international law, let us examine a former regime, which also was partway
between primitive and modem legal systems-the Icelandic Republic, or
6. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBeL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN
PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDECE 49 (1941); A. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW: PAST AND PRESENT 162
(1971) ("The Food Gatherers have no rulers or chiefs .. . ").
7. See generally B. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SociETy 52 (1926) ("[ln
the main these rules are followed because their practical utility is recognized by reason and
testified by experience.").
8. See H. KELsoN, supra note 1, at 78. One eharacteristic of all legal systeres is that laws
are not universally enforced. Id
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Free State, around the year 1000 A.D. The law was customary; the
peoples of the Icelandic Republic had inherited a body of rules from the
Germanic tribes.
9  
These rules were carried across the oceans from
Norway and other points in the North Atlantic and were applied by a
Folkmeet, called the Althing-the "Thing of All."'0 Once a year, all of
the freemen gathered at Thingvellir to perform legislative and adjudicative
functions." A select group was permitted to amend the customary laws.
Although this centralization of the lawmaking function applied mainly to
procedural rules, in the year 1000, it was used to reject the old pagan
religion and to convert the populace of Iceland by one fell legislative
swoop into a Christian nation.'
2 
This was a rudimentary centralization
because everyone who was enfranchised came together at one time and
place.
The Althing also performed an adjudicative function.'
3 
Selected
members of the Althing would sit either as a court of original jurisdiction,
to hear cases involving litigants from different regions of Iceland; or as an
appellate court, hearing appeals from the four regional Things." Thus,
there was a marked centralization of the adjudicative function.
What makes Iceland particularly useful in comparing international law
to both primitive and modem legal systems is the enforcement function in
the Icelandic Free State. The Icelandic police system lacked a sheriff or a
bailiff.' The ruling motif of that society was equality; they would not
tolerate a monarch in the form of a single police authority enforcing the
judgments of the Althing.' Everyone participated in enforcing the law.
When the court sat and adjudged that a crime had been committed-norm-
ally a crime against property (theft or robbery) or a crime against the
person (violence, including murder)-a punishment would be declared.
The punishment consisted either of a fine (in England, the Wergild, which
varied according to the rank of the victim) or banishment, termed outlawry,
which meant that the person who had been convicted was outside the
9. See L. LARSON, TlE EARLtEsr NoRwEGIAN LAWS 4-7 (1935)
10. See I J. BRYCs, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURisPRuDENE 323 (1901).
11. Id. at 326. Thlingvellir is translated as the Valley of the Thing, id.
12. Id. at 332, 349-51.
13. For the fictional portrayal of a trial on a charge of unlawful assault, see NJAL'S AGA
298-315 (M. Magnusson & H. Palsson trans. 1960).
14. 1 J. BRYCe, supra note 10, at 325.
15. Id. at 333.
16. Id. at 355.
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protection of the law and anyone could kill him." The one who killed




International law is a customary legal system. Its rules were not
promulgated through legislation; rather, they were developed in practice
over time. Much international law today is still customary, growing out of
the reciprocal needs of nations expressed through their actions. The
behavior of sovereign nations toward one another is constrained by the
perception of legal boundaries. 9 This gentle condition accords with the
relatively unfettered nation-state system.
One great weakness of a customary system is its limited capacity for
rapid change. Primitive legal systems are notoriously slow in changing
their rules.' Customary international law, at times, has responded with
great rapidity. At the outbreak of the First World War, for example, all of
the old laws of blockade and contraband laws were superseded for the
duration of the war by new rules of Navicert,2' under which the British,
who controlled the seas, gave papers in advance to ships carrying neutral
cargo, as opposed to the old system of boarding ships at sea to examine the
cargo.22 This example, however, is an exception to a more pervasive
phenomenon of slowness in the change of customary international law.
From the date of President Truman's Proclamation on the Continental Shelf
in 1945, it took thirty-five years to develop a new rule of customary
international law which created a 200-mile belt of adjacent waters over
which the riparian state has exclusive economic rights.
23
International law is decentralized in its adjudicative function also. It
is a far better example of a dispersed judicial function than most exemplifi-
cations of primitive law, and is in striking contrast to the monopoly of the
robe as found in modem societies. The adjudicative function in interna-
17. Id. at 320-21, 327 n.1, 334.
18. NJALS AGA, supra note 13, at 16.
19. See H.LA. HART, supra note 1, at 215-21; see infra note 81 and acompanying text.
20. Id. at 90-91.
21. See G. voN GLAHN, LAW AMONG NAnoNs: AN INTRODUcTION TO PUBLIC INTERNA-
TONAL LAW 764-65 (Sth ed. 1986).
22. Id. at 763.
23. See S. DAVID & P. DIGESER, TE UNTTED STATEs AND THE LAW OF THE SEA TE.ATY
4-6, 30-36 (1990).
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tional law is carried out by a process of reciprocal adjudication."
Reciprocal adjudication means that each state is judging the other but no
country may judge a conflict to which it is a party. The rest of the world
adjudicates the conflict in a subtle process similar to the one ascribed to
in the village hypothetical, which commences after the violation of the rule
against walking on someone else's yam patch. The sanctions are also
subtle-those of censure and disapproval preponderate over anything
substantial. International law is quite primitive in its adjudicative function,
in that it is exercised by everyone to everyone, at one time or another.
Finally, international law has no centralized enforcement mecha-
nism-no policemen, no sheriff, and no bailiff. The lack of an enforce-
ment tool is often is cited as the greatest weakness of international law.
By way of comparison, it is worth noting that the legal system in the
Icelandic Free State degenerated into clan warfare, and the Icelanders
eventually put themselves under the protection of the King of Norway.'
Does international law get carried out? If so, how? To approach this
question, let us look more closely at the three functions of the international
legal system and analyze them in terms of their adequacy to meet the needs
of the world today. This analysis may proceed from an examination of the
directions these functions are taking with regard to centralization.
V. LAWMAKING
One need not wait for customary law to change. Countries may make
new rules among themselves by mutual agreement. There are tendencies
toward centralization of the legislative function in international law through
conferences in which countries send authorized representatives to negotiate
treaties, which create binding obligations among the participants. These
conferences are like legislatures, in that they enact proposals for new rules
of law. Their limitations, however, are staggering. First, they normally are
limited to a single subject matter and do not have the general competence
found in national legislatures. Second, they operate on a principle of
unanimity, which is based on the fundamental rule of the law of nations
that no state may be bound without its own consent.
6 
This contrasts with
the majoritarian principle of national parliaments, under which laws
adopted by a qualified vote are binding on everyone. The logic of the
24. See M. MCOnuoAL, H. LAswzu., & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIoHTs AND WORLD PUsLIC
ORDER 308 (1980).
25. See W. MILLER, BLOODTANG AND PEACEKEEPiNo 39 (1990); J. BYOCK, MEDIEVAL
ICEALAND 8 (1988); see also H.L.A. Hart, supra note 1, at 91.
26. H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 219.
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principle of unanimity permits the exclusion of dissenters, but it has the
countervailing disadvantage of reducing the number of participants. This
dilemma is ameliorated in two different ways. First, the parties may permit
reservations, so that not every country is required to consent to the entire
treaty. This leads, however, to inevitable confusion as to who has
promised what to whom." Second, the parties may forsake formal
vote-taking in favor of the crystallization of consensus. This technique was
used in the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
which deliberated for twenty-five years.?
A third weakness of international conferences is that they may
deliberate over long periods of time; this weakness is evident in national
legislatures also. The fourth failing of intemational conferences is that the
results of their deliberations are merely recommendatory. Each nation
reserves the right to ratify or reject the proposed treaty.29 Thus, at the
end of the long series of UNCLOS meetings, with a change of administra-
tions in Washington, President Reagan declined to submit the treaty for
ratification by the United States Senate.30 In sum, international legisla-
tures are single-subject consultative bodies whose deliberations may be
subjected to a liberum veto.
Despite these handicaps, the international community has issued a
multitude of binding international agreements, both bilateral and multilater-
al. Primitive legal systems cannot handle complicated and voluminous
rules. In ancient Iceland, all of the laws were memorized by the Lawsayer,
who recited them in their entirety every three years and voiced the key
procedural rules annually.3' In simple primeval societies, virtually every
adult knew the majority of the rules." With the development of the
written word, the capacity grew for the legal system to expand the number
of norms and their complexity. Now we are enmeshed in another
revolution, this time of computer technology, which permits us to handle
27. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Advisory Opinion), 1951 I.C.J. 91; see also Clark, The Viwnna Convention
Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 8 AM. J. INV'L L.
281 (1991).
28. See A. ADEDE, THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DIsPuTes UNDER TH UNITED
NATIoNs CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A DRAFnNG HISTORY AND A COMMENTARY
4 (1987).
29. See G. VON GLAHN, supra note 21, at 495.
30. See R. tious & J PLANO, THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND
PoLrincs 257 (1988).
31. See 1 J. BRYCE, supra note 10, at 327-28.
32. H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 89-90.
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even more norms. Modem international jurisprudence is able to handle
both simple norms like those of diplomatic immunity, analogous to yam
patch norms, and complicated tax and trade laws, which provide the thick
law books on the shelves of law libraries in any contemporary state.
Some of these tomes do not represent significant new law, but merely
the restatement of pre-existing customary law. For example, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties was in considerable part a codification
of the pre-existing rules.
33 
In contrast, UNCLOS, while partly a codifica-
tion, also attempted to establish a new regime to govern the conservation
and exploitation of ocean resources.'
VI. ADJUDICATION
There is an International Court of Justice (ICJ), presiding at the
Hague. Its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ), was formed after the First World War and possessed most of the
features of its future incarnation. Although the World Court has existed
for nearly seventy years, its limitations are numerous. For example, the
general principle of consent dominates; a country must consent if it is to
be brought before the ICJ.' A number of treaties provide for the
submission of disputes to the World Court. In addition, pursuant to article
36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ, countries may give general consent
beforehand as to other countries which do the same.' Some states have
adhered in advance to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, but with a
variety of debilitating reservations.37 Another severe limitation of the
court's jurisdictional authority is that only nations may be recognized as
parties; private individuals may appear, only if they can get their own
country to take up the case.
3 
The fact that so many of the cases heard
33. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered intoforce
Jan 27, 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
34. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62(122, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, OFictAl. TEXT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENnIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXEs AND INDEx, U.N.
Sales No. E.83.v.5. (1988).
35. H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 3.
36. See R. RIGOS & J. PLANO, supra note 30, at 195-96.
37. See id. at 196. ("As of July 1986, the requisite deelaeation was in force for 46 of the
162 parties to the Statute [of the IC]."). The United States withdrew its Declaration on April
7, 1986. Id.
38. See Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium
v, Spain), 1970 l.CJ. 3.
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by the ICI and PCIJ have turned on the question of jurisdiction is a
symptom of the weakness of the World Court and a sign that its problems
are structural. Consequently, the ICJ ordinarily hears only one or two
matters at a time. 9 Some of these have been advisory opinions rendered
at the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the
United Nations.' The World Court has rendered some opinions of
substantial importance both for the development of international law and
for the interpretation of the United Nations Charter."
The bulk of international disputes that have been settled have used
other avenues, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or special
courts, rather than escalate to the time-consuming process of going to the
ICJ, which is a lawyer's paradise of bilingual procedures, voluminous
documents, verbose arguments, wordy judgments and multiple concurring
and dissenting opinions.
42 
When the ICJ presided over the 1955 French
application on a dispute, which arose in 1931, for which other attempts at
reconciliation had failed, the ICJ took exactly two years, twelve public
hearings, and two volumes of proceedings totalling 1004 pages to decide
that it had no jurisdiction in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France
v. Norway)."' In addition, the written opinion, which was printed in
English and French and had six dissenting or concurring opinions, took
another 182 pages to complete."
There are other international courts of many kinds, bilateral and
multilateral, regional and global, each usually dealing with a specific area
of possible disagreement. Many international disputes are settled in
national courts. Litigation in any forum is a last resort (short of the use of
force, which, as explained below, is now illegal). Most disputes are
resolved by the parties themselves. Third-party intervention has many
forms other than lawsuits. The dominance of other means of dispute
resolution helps to explain why the growth of international tribunals has
39. R. RIGGS & J. PLANO, supra note 30, at 194.
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 96.
41. See T. FaANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 10 (1986). The ICJ recently has had a
spate of cases relating to the delineation of boundaries dividing the continental shelf, for which
it has used more efficient specialized Chambers. Id. at 72-73.
42. See S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 98-137 (4th
rev. ed. 1989); see also Larson, The Law Structure of Peace, 27 TENN. L. REv. 505 (1960).
43. Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), 1957 lC.J. 9 (Judgment of July
6, 1957).
44. See it.; cf C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 923 (1971) ("You are to reflect ... that this has
been a great cause, that this has been a protracted cause, that this has been a complex cause.
Jamdyce and Jamdyce has been termed, not inaptly, a Monument of Chancery practice.").
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been sporadic and chaotic. UNCLOS provides for compulsory judicial
dispute settling machinery with a wide range of choice of the particular
means available to the parties: ICJ, International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, and Arbitral Tribunals.
45 
It is probably premature to seek a
unified global court system, which would include an appeal to an
International Supreme Court. Instead, we should continue to foster grass
roots courts, which get to the problems where they are found.
VH. TUE SECURITY COUNCIL
There is one primary world-wide court in a very crucial area of
international concern-the Security Council of the United Nations. One
of the main functions of the Security Council is the responsibility to
adjudge threats to the peace and to take appropriate action.'
War was lawful until 1928.
47 
Customary international law permitted
nations to make war. Not only were countries allowed to fight each other,
but-under the joint principles of reciprocal adjudication and decentralized
enforcement-countries conducting wars could claim that they were
enforcing international law. At the turn of the century, for example,
Britain, Germany, and Italy blockaded Venezuela in order to compel the
payment of contract debts." A special tribunal of the Hague Permanent
Court of Arbitration (predecessor of the PCIJ) not only validated the
forcible intervention, but gave preference to the claims of the three
blockading states as against other claimants.
49
The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, also known as The Pact of Paris, under
which the world's prominent nations renounced aggressive war and
promised to resolve problems only through peaceful means, changed this
situation drastically.
50 
The Pact of Paris-which was revised and
incorporated as article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, prohibiting "the
threat or use of force ... in ... international relations"-established no
enforcement mechanism, but simply legislated a new rule. The League of
Nations provided only a cooling-off period for nations threatening to go to
45. See G. SiNGH, UNITED NATIONS CoNvENTiorN ON TmE LAW OF THE SEA DiSPtLJE
So-rLEMaET MEcHANisms 213 (1985).
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
47. R. RiGos & S. PLANO, supra note 30, at 12.
48. Germany et at. v. Venezuela (Preferential Claims Case), Tribunal of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration (1904).
49. See C. PFNWtCK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 438 n.5 (2d ed. 1934).
50. See 0. VON GLAHN, supra note 21, at 584-87.
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war against one another.5" Furthermore, this cooling-off period was
premised upon a unanimous Security Council decision (but without the
participation of the parties to the dispute).52 Members of the League were
obliged "to take enforcement measures not involving the use of force
against an aggressor, but left to their discretion the taking of enforcement
measures involving the use of armed force." 3
Based upon analysis of the origins of the First World War, the
draftsmen of the League Covenant hoped that nations would pull back,
contemplate the stupidity of war, and desist. 4 The Second World War
disabused most people of that notion. The United Nations Charter was
meant to remedy this structural defect by providing a centralized adjudica-
tive body to determine when the provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact had
been violated." Action by the Security Council is based upon a majori-
tarian principle. Nine of its fifteen members must concur, and the
affirmative vote must include each of the five victorious allies from the
Second World War (the permanent members): China, France, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 56 The General
Assembly elects the other ten members to staggered two-year terms.
57
With the emergence of the cold war in 1946 the political basis for
Security Council action was undercut; as Winston Churchill put it, an Iron
Curtain had "descended across the continent." S Still, when North Korea
invaded South Korea in the early 1950s, the Security Council was able to
adjudge that the attack was unlawful and to direct that it forcefully be
resisted." At the time of the invasion, the Soviet Union was boycotting
the Security Council as a protest against the continued presence of the
51. R. RIGGS & J. PLANO, supra note 30, at 7.
52. LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENANT art. 15, par. 6.
53. See H. KELseN, THE LAW OF T-E UNITED NATIONS: A CRTmCAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLErMS 985 (1950).
54. See 1. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZAT1ONS 44-48 (4th ed. 1971). The rationale of collective security was
not to put the League or the United Nations at war with an aggressor, as recently in the Middle
East against Iraq, but rather to prevent war "by the deterrent effect of oveewhehiog power.
.. I d. at 250.
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
56. Id. art. 27, para. 3.
57. Id. art. 23, para. 2.
58. The Sinews of Peace, in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCILL: His COMPLETE SPEECIHES 7290 (R.
Jaoes ed. 1974).
59. See H. KELSEN, supra note 53, at 927, 931.
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Nationalist Chinese in the organs of the United Nations.' The National-
ists had been pushed off the Mainland of China in 1949 and had retreated
to Formosa. The Soviet Union wanted the People's Republic of China to
be recognized and to take its seat as a permanent member of the Security
Council.
A customary rule of law had developed in the Security Council,
interpreting the provisions of the Charter for the exercise of the veto.
6
'
Through practice the members established that abstention was not a
veto.' By abstaining, a permanent member could refrain from supporting
a measure, which it did not favor, without going to the often criticized
extreme of imposing a veto. When the Soviets walked out and the Korean
matter came before the Security Council, a further interpretation was made
that absence was tantamount to silence.
3 
The Soviet Union was unable
to exercise its veto, and therefore the soldiers who fought against the North
Koreans (and later the Chinese) did so under the banner of the United
Nations, carrying out a police action to enforce the judgment of the
Security Council." The response of the United Nations reflected a clear-
cut centralization of the adjudicative function.
The framers of the United Nations Charter envisaged the creation of
an army to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.' If this had
been accomplished, we would have established a centralized enforcement
mechanism, at least with regard to threats against peace. With the
emergence of the cold war and the disappearance of cooperation among the
permanent members of the Security Council, this army never materialized.
Consequently, in the Korean action, an ad hoc army had to be created,
composed mainly of American and secondarily of South Korean and other
troops." Even though the Korean War ended in a stalemate, it represent-
ed a distinct, but rudimentary, centralization of the enforcement function.
The allied forces recently in the Persian Gulf were another ad hoc army,
also composed primarily of American forces.
60. See id at 940-42.
61. See id at 241.
62. See id. at 241-44.
63. See id at 244-45.
64. See id at 936-38.
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 43. According to Hans Kelsen, "the Charter establishet a force
monopoly of the Organisation to be exercised by the Security Council and only by the Security
Council." H. KEtsEN, supra note 53, at 970.
66. See R. Rimos & I. PLANo, supra note 30, at 130.
1991] HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13
VIII. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Following the Korean War, it was clear that the Soviet Union would
not be absent again from the Security Council. Thus, the threat of a veto
was ever-present. The United Nations took some steps to rectify the
paralysis of the Security Council and the absence of an army. In
November 1950, the General Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace
Resolution, which moved the peacekeeping function back to the General
Assembly after the Security Council had been frustrated by the veto.
67
The Resolution maintained the General Assembly as a body permanently
in session, so that it could be called upon on short notice by any seven
members of the Security Council or by a majority of UN members."
A number of third world countries and smaller European powers
established military contingents to be provided in response to requests from
the United Nations.69 These serve as a decentralized substitute for a
genuine United Nations army. The peacekeeping work of the General
Assembly is implicitly judicial, that is, "to [make] appropriate recommen-
dations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a
breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when
necessary . . 0 In practice, the General Assembly does not act to
adjudicate or to punish, but to mediate. The United Nations peacekeeping
forces generally patrol their posts with the permission of all concerned. In
the Middle East in 1967, for example, as a new outbreak of Arab-Israeli
warfare was impending, Secretary-General U Thant withdrew the United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) after President Nasser of the United
Arab Republic demanded their departure."
IX. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
In the early 1960s, in an attempt to implement the policy of preventive
diplomacy, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskj6ld initially got the Security
Council to act against the attempt by the province of Katanga to secede
from the new nation of the Congo (now the Republic of Zaire), which had
67. Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377A, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N.
Doc. A/1775 (1951).
68. Id. at § Al.
69. See R. Rioos & J. PLANO, supra note 30, at 13443.
70. Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note 67, at 10.
71. See t. CLAUD, supra note 54, at 315.
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become independent from Belgium.' He devised this policy so that local
conflicts would not be polarized by the cold war into East-West dis-
putes.
73  
The operation was a success but the doctor died. Through
militant pacification, with a peak of 20,000 United Nations troops, the
United Nations forces fought the rebels and mercenaries of Katanga, and
the civil war was eventually suppressed.
4 
Hammarskj6ld died in 1961
in an airplane crash in Africa." The Soviet Union felt that it had been
betrayed by the failure of the United Nations to prevent the removal from
office and later the assassination of Patrice Lurnumba.'
5 
After Hammar-
skj6ld's death, the Soviet Union eventually abandoned its proposal to
trifurcate the office of Secretary-General into a troika of representatives
from Eastern, Western, and neutral nations." Nevertheless, it was clear
that no future Secretary-General would be allowed to assume such a
dynamic role as long as the cold war endured. Hammarskjbld was unable
to jockey the Security Council into a lasting resumption of its function as
the judge and policeman against threats to world peace.
X. ASSESSMENT
A. Lawmaking
In lawmaking, the international legal system has recourse both to the
subtle creativity of customary law and to the enactments of rudimentary
legislatures. With regard to the former, if an anachronistic law is flouted
often enough, it is effectively repealed. The people vote with their feet: a
yam patch too close to an expanding village square becomes trampled and
ceases to be a yam patch, no longer triggering the rule against trespassing.
Nations vote with their arms: when the British controlled the entire Atlantic
Ocean, as they did in the First World War, the point of blockade moved
from the harbor of destination to the harbor of departure. There are fewer
nations than there are people in all but the smallest tribes, and nations are
more sophisticated. These factors, together with the pressure that stems
from the possibility of legislative change, give international customary law
a greater capacity for change than one finds in isolated, pre-literate
72. See id. at 316.
73. See id. at 312-34.
74. Id.
75. See C. O'BRIEN, To KATANGA AND BACK: A U.N. CASE HisTORY 286 (1962).
76. See id at 93-96.
77. See t. CLAUDE, supra note 54, at 128, 152, 209, 331-32.
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societies. One example of its conduciveness to change is the recent
expansion of the contiguous zone of waters, which gave riparian states a
200-mile zone of exclusive exploitation of minerals and fish, while
retaining the right of the ships of all nations to traverse these waters. This
change was stimulated and paralleled by the efforts of UNCLOS to enact
the same rule as conventional law.
As far as legislative enactment is concerned, while the international
machinery suffers from the defects previously mentioned, it often has the
compensatory advantage of dealing with only one main subject. The
diplomats, who are professional negotiators, either are experts or become
experts on the topic at hand. Major diplomatic deliberations are usually
protracted, and their results are sometimes meager. The product of
international conventions however, must be compared to the less-than-per-
fect national legislatures, which also frequently stumble.
B. Adjudication
Turning to the adjudicative function, for two main reasons nations do
not have as great a need for centralized courts as individuals. First, like the
people of primitive societies, nations are remarkably law-abiding.
78 
On
a per capita basis, the violation of modem sumptuary laws (traffic laws,
such as jaywalking, or restrictions on consumption of mind and mood
altering substances, such as alcohol and drugs) outnumber tribal trespasses
or transgressions of the law by states. Natives and nations rarely scoff
laws, while flouting the speed limit on modem freeways is common.
Bronislaw Malinowski attributes tribal acquiescence and submission to "the
concatenation of the obligations, in the fact that they are arranged into
chains of mutual services, a give and take extending over long periods of
time and covering wide aspects of interest and activity.
"
" Primitive
peoples have fewer laws to obey, and the rules are inculcated from infancy.
Although nations have many laws to observe they have the technical
capacity to master them, and-unlike mortals-they are corporate bodies
which need not sleep and which, with rare exception, vouch for the legality
of all of their actions. Most of the actions of states are public and are held
out to be lawful. Covert action by states-ranging from espionage to
assassination and destabilization-is relatively rare.
Second, nations are more eager than many individuals to solve,
resolve, or mediate disputes, rather than push them to formal adjudication.
78. See Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988).
79. B. MAuNowsju, supra note 7, at 67; see also H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 89.
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On a spectrum of litigiousness, nations are more like the citizens of Japan,
to whom litigation is anathema, than like the citizens of the United States,
who are noted for their willingness to sue. Even in America, querulants
are the exception. For a legal system to survive, most of its subjects must
settle their problems without recourse to the courts. Particularly in
commercial matters, nations and individuals need predictability and finality;
they create courts to resolve disputes and also to provide an ultimate threat
of coercive resolution, which stimulates voluntary compromise.
The international judicial system is generally adequate to the needs of
global society, even in the crucial area of adjudicating the unlawful use of
force. There are means to adjudge violations. Reciprocal adjudication,
whether completely decentralized or with rudimentary centralization as in
the United Nations General Assembly (the global Thing of All), can point
the finger, but it cannot compel compliance with the law.
The International Court of Justice which is much more centralized, can
adjudge violations of the rule against the unlawful use of force (as it has
done recently in the Hostages and Nicaragua cases), but, pursuant to
article 94(2) of the United Nations Charter, it can rely only upon the
Security Council for military enforcement."
C. Enforcement
The law rests lightly upon the shoulders of nation-states. They are
required to act as they have acted in the past, when they felt legally
obligated." This burden includes the duty to abide by international
agreements. When a law is breached, nations usually voluntarily comply
either with the manifestations of decentralized adjudication or with the
declaratory judgments of the General Assembly or the World Court.
Regrettably, it is precisely in the area of enforcement of sanctions against
violations of the rule prohibiting the use of force that reliance upon
voluntary compliance is inherently inadequate. There are shortcomings in
the law itself. Two exceptions were made to the bald prohibition of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact when the restriction upon national use of force was
incorporated into the United Nations Charter. First, Article 51 of the
Charter recognizes the inherent right of self-defense.
2 
If the Security
Council were functioning as intended, self-help would serve only as a
stopgap measure, pending adjudication and enforcement against the
80. U.N. CHeArrl art. 94, pam. 2.
81. See H. KELSON, supra note 1, at 324.
82. See Ftanck, supra note 75, at 721.
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aggressor. As a result of the paralysis of the Security Council, however,
self-help has become the main protection against aggression. Iran
responded to an attack by Iraq in 1980, and the world tolerated an
old-fashioned war between these two nations for eight years. Self-defense
may be escalated when the government of a state under attack invites other
nations to assist in repelling aggression. For example, in the Vietnam war,
South Vietnam asked the United States to send troops to fight the invading
North Vietnamese and to suppress civil insurrection by the Viet Cong.
3
More recently, the Soviet Union claimed that they were invited by the
Afghanistan government, to aid in the suppression of a rebellion."
The second exception to the monopoly on the legitimate use of
international force, given to the United Nations by article 2(4) of the
Charter, is the provision for regional peacekeeping in article 52.Y The
United States has used this alternative as a device to insulate military
conflict in the Western Hemisphere from United Nations intervention."
Invoking the mantle of the Organization of American States (OAS) 7 the
authority of the Rio Pact" and other regional arrangements, the United
States has purported to act as a policeman in the Dominican Republic
(1965)89 and Grenada (19 8 3).' Neither the United Nations nor the OAS
has been able to suppress protracted violence in Central America. In the
world today, the lack of effective centralized enforcement is the fatal flaw
of international organization, whether applied against regional military
conflict or civil war.
International law has compensated for the deficiencies of its own
institutions by adding rudimentary legislatures to the creation of law by
custom and by supplementing reciprocal adjudication with ad hoc courts.
For the most part, coercive enforcement has not been necessary. In the
83. "[ln response to your request, we ure prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to
protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly increase our assistance
to your defense effort...." Letter from John F. Kennedy to Ngo Dinh Diem, Dec. 14, 1961,
reprinted in M. Gern.EMAN, VITcNAM 209 (1965).
84. But cf Reisman & Silk Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 485 (1988) (arguing that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan).
85. U.N. Charter art. 52.
86. See M. ErizoNt, THE MAjoRrry oF ONE 126-60 (1970).
87. See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, amended Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847.
88. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 121
U.N.TS. 77.
89. See G. VON GLANN, supra note 21, at 161.
90. See id. at 153.
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end, however, violence can be effectively restrained only by the availability
of greater force. Unsuppressed violence is not only destructive in its own
right, but it adds to the danger of world annihilation through nuclear war.
Recently, due to the rapprochement between the United States and the
Soviet Union, the United Nations negotiated a cease-fire between Iran and
Iraq and is actively engaged in responding to international violence
elsewhere.
Despite these recent successes,
9
' international law is more effective
where less needed and less effective where most needed. A Third World
War has been forestalled more by the fear of nuclear holocaust than by
rudimentary world government. In the areas where it works best,
exemplified in the specialized agencies of the United Nations that deal with
health, labor, and refugees, the proper mode of analysis is process, that is,
where do we want to go and how do we get there? In the area of
peacekeeping, there is discussion of the need for structural reform, but it
is at the fringes.' The main participants, the nation-states, are not
pushing for reform. The Charter of the United Nations is rigid, requiring
a proposal by two-thirds of the General Assembly members and ratification





The Charter has been amended only twice: in
1965, the membership of the Security Council was increased from eleven
to fifteen, to give greater representation to the increased number of United
Nations members; in 1971, the size of the Economic and Social Council
increased from twenty-seven to fifty-four.'
Do we need a global perestroika, a constitutional convention to revise
the Charter, or should we simply try to make the cumbersome system work
as it is? The political premise of the creation of the United Nations was
the unity of the victorious Allies. With harmony, the structure will suffice;
without harmony, it cannot be changed. There will probably be no major
structural change until such change is no longer needed. Thus, we should
seek answers in the political rather than in the constitutional realm, and
91. See Shannon, U.N. Leader Praises 'Major Strides,' Sees Better Prospects for World
Peace, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1988, § 1, at 8, col. 1; The UN Has Changed, Christian Science
Monitor, Sept. 28, 1988, at 15. President Ronald Reagan praised the efforts of Secretary-
General Javier Perez de Cuellar, who had been at or near the center of efforts to mediate an end
to several regional conflicts: Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, Cyprus, Cambodia,
and the Western Sahara. Id.
92. See T. FRANcK, NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE UN DREAM AND
WHAT TE U.S. CAN Do ABouT IT 270 (1985).
93. U.N. CHARTER art. 108.
94, See BAsic DocUMENTs IN INTERNATIONAL L W 2 n.1 (1. Bowrdie 3d. ed. 1983).
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point to process rather than structure. We should build on East-West
rapprochement. The spirit of detente has flourished since the accession to
power of Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. This transformation
permitted the Security Council to respond to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.
Reducing East-West tension may help to provide the time and resources
needed to grapple with North-South problems. The League of Nations, like
the Articles of Confederation, was too loose for la trek. The 1945
constitutional convention in San Francisco, which drafted the United
Nations Charter, created a viable structure of world governance, adequate
to support the political process of progress towards peace and prosperity.
XI. HUMAN RIGHTS
This article's analysis of the allocation of power in world governance
has ignored the related phenomenon of denial of power. Within states, the
denial of power to governments is measured in great part by the extent of
the civil liberties of the inhabitants, such as freedom of speech, press, and
assembly, as well as freedom from arrest or from expropriation of property
without due process of law. In the United States, civil liberties are
embodied mainly in the Bill of Rights, which comprises the first ten
amendments to the Constitution.
9  
The notion of limited government,
however, is broader than civil liberties, encompassing structural protections
such as federalism and separation of powers. Professor Carl Friedrich
subsumes all of these limitations on governmental power under the rubric
of "constitutionalism," which he defines as a "technique of establishing and




The structural limitations on world government are enormous. The
nation-states, the subordinate units, are the dominant beneficiaries of
international constitutionalism, that is, the fundamental decentralization of
world law. Nonetheless, international law is a technique of effective
regularized restraint upon the behavior of nation-statesY To what degree
does this global constitutionalism extend to the protection of individuals?
The answer to this question provides a measure of the existence of human
rights, the international counterpart of domestic civil liberties.
Traditional international law gave citizens no protection from the
actions of their own countries. Only states were recognized as parties to
95. U.S. COrST. amends. I-X.
96. C. FRIEDRICH, CoNSTITrnONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN FUROPE AND AMERICA 121 (1950).
97. See Andens, A Critique a/Professor Myres X McDougals's Doctrine ofInterpretation
by Major Purposes, 57 Am. J. INT'L . 378-84 (1963).
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international law." Individuals had no independent legal personality."
States could protect only their own nationals, not the nationals of other
states.'" Short of going to war on grounds of humanitarian interven-
tion,' there was no legal basis for third-party state intervention or
intervention by international organizations to protect citizens from
mistreatment by their own state. The dominant principle-non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs of other countries-was enshrined (with the
exception of Security Council peacekeeping actions) in United Nations
Charter article 2(7).'0
A century ago, early inroads were made into this vacuum of protection
through treaties which protected minorities.' 3 In the interwar period, the
League of Nations Covenant required that mandatory powers not abuse
their colonial charges.'"
The international legislative function played an important role in the
expansion of human rights following the end of the Second World War.
For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal, which held that Nazi officials were
legally responsible for war crimes, recognized the standing of individuals
under international law.'" Article 1(3) of the United Nations Charter
articulated the goal of "promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion."'" The General Assembly responded to this
challenge in 1948 by adopting the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.'" In addition, negotiations were completed in 1966 for two
major treaties, which are essentially bills of rights-the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination'"
98. See 0. VON OLAHN, supra note 21, at 57.
99. Id. at 179; see C. Oliver, supra note 1.
100. See The Notteboh. Case (Liechtenstein v. Guaterala), 1955 I.C.J. 4.
101. See T. BUEROENTAL, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS 14-15 (1988).
102. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paa. 7.
103. See T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 101, at 4-5.
104. id. at 2-7,
105. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J.
INT'L . 172 (1947); 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946).
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, parn. 3.
107. Universal Declaration of Hurman Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (II), 3 U.N. GAOR at 71,
arts. 3, 6, U.N. Doec. A/810 (1948); see E. SCHWELB, HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION of HuMAN RIGHTS,
1948-63 (1964).
108. BAsi DocuMENTs IN INTERNATIONAL L W AND WORLD ORDER 190-95 (B. Weston,
R. Falk, & A. D'Arnato, eds. 1980).
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and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
1°9 
Regional
human rights treaties have also been developed, most notably in Afri-
ca,"
e 
the Americas,"' Western Europe,"2 and between East and
West in Basket Three of the 1975 Helsinki Accords."
3 
Numerous other
human rights treaties are also in effect."
4
The rudimentary centralization of the legislative task has been
sufficient to the enactment of extensive human rights law."
' 
The treaties
are binding, at least initially, only upon the states that ratify them."
6
Portions of this legislation, however, have become part of customary
international law, binding upon all nations, particularly the prohibitions
against torture and arbitrary arrest. In the 1980 case of Fildrtiga v.
Pefia-lrala,'
1
' the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
cited, among other documents, the United Nations General Assembly
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture."' The Court concluded that after "[hlaving examined the
109. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A16316 (1967) [hereinafter International
Covenant], reprinted in 6 l.L.M. 368 (1963).
110. Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39,
reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963). In article 30 the charter provides for the creation of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. See T. BuERGEcrHAL, supra note 101,
at 181-89; Gittleman, The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and
Procedures, in GUIDE To INTERNATIONA. HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 153-62 (14. Hannum ed.
1984).
111. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), Bogota, O.A.S. Off. Ree.
OEA/Ser. LV/1.4 Rev. (1965); American Convention on Hunman Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser. 14V/I.23 doe. 21 rev. 6 (1979) [hereinafter
American Convention], reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
112. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].
113. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Etorpe, Aug. 1, 1975, U.S.
Der, STATE PUB. No. 8826 (Gen'[ For. Pol Set. 298), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
114. See generally BAsIC DOCUMETrS IN INTERNATIONAL L W AND WORLDORDER, supra
note 108, at 157-246.
115. See generally A. D'AmATO, INTERNATIONAL LAw: PROCESS AND PROSPECT (1987);
L. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
116. See G. VON Gt.AmN, supra note 21, at 376. The United States has lagged notoriously
in the ratification of such treaties. See generally N. KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND
THE SENATE: A HISTORY Or OpFoSTON (1990).
117. Fildtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cit. 1980)
118. Declaration on the Protection of Any Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doe A/10034 (1975) [hereinafter Protection from Torture
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sources from which customary international law is derived-the usage of
nations, judicial opinions and the works ofjurists... -that official torture
is now prohibited by the law of nations.""
9 
In addition, the federal
district court in Fernandez v. Wilkinson placed arbitrary arrest in the same
category." Cumulatively, this proliferation of human rights law reduc-
ing the scope of the inviolable sphere of exclusive domestic jurisdiction
represents a significant shift in the structure of international law
2 t
-a
development comparable in significance to the 1791 addition of the
American Bill of Rights to the 1788 American Constitution. The
absorption of portions of human rights treaty law into the corpus of
international customary law is analogous to fourteenth amendment
incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights (originally directed only to the
national government) for application against the American States. Opening
state police conduct to external scrutiny reflects the growing cultural,
economic and political permeability of the nation-state. The previously
fairly clear-cut boundary between domestic and foreign policy has all but
disappeared, replaced by intertwined economies and interpenetrated
political, cultural, and social milieux.
How is this human rights law adjudicated? As in the Filariga case,
allegations of violation may be litigated in decentralized national courts.
Globally, there is some rudimentary centralization of the adjudicative
function. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment, for example, sets up a ten-person Committee Against
Torture to receive and investigate complaints made by states or individuals
Dclaration].
119. 630 F.2d at 882; see T. ButErENTHAL, supra note 101, at 245-46; see also N.
RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AW (1987); K. RANDALL,
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM (1990); T. MERON,
HuMAN RiGHTs AND HuMANsTARiAN NoRMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (t989).
120. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aftd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th
Cir. 1981). The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States lists the
following as a violation of International Customary Law: (a) genocide; (b) slavery or slave
trade; (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals; (d) tortare or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (e) prolonged arbitrary detention; (f) systematic
racial discrimination; or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights. RESTATEMENT HIRD OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF TRE UNITED STATES
§ 702. The last category might include apartheid. Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, Human Rights
and the Emerging International Constitution, 9 HotsTRA L. REV. 475, 509-10 (198 1) ("[A]
reasonably intelligent, objective judge could determine that there is today a set of acts or
government programs which constitutes an identifiable, internationally i legal set of
camprehensive, coereive, discriminatory activities into which category ... apartheid fits?").
121. See Capotorti, Human Rights: The Hard Road Towards Universality, in THE
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL AW, supra note 1, at 977.
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and to take up cases on its own initiative." Similarly, the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
establishes a Human Rights Committee "to receive and consider . . .
communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant."'"
These committees carry out an Ombudsmanlike function. Although
they have the power to receive complaints, investigate and form and
express an opinion,"
t 
they are given no power of enforcement. Due to
their lack of enforcement power, Ombudsman offices are well suited for
the international arena.n Even within each country, domestic Ombuds-
man offices rely successfully on voluntary compliance with their recom-
mendations."'
The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights does
not adjudieate individual petitions.
27  
Instead, the commission has
limited itself for the most part to the confidential investigation of charges
that tend to establish "a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested
violations." s In protecting prisoners of war or civilians in occupied
territories, however, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(I.C.R.C.) discreetly adjudges violations of the Geneva Conventions."
9
122. Protection from Torture Declaration, supra note 118, art. 4.
123. International Covenant, supra note 109, preamble. The Protocol does not give the
Committee the power to compel testimony or the production of evidence. 1d
124. See W. GEtIuoRN, OMUDSMENAND OTES 422,436(1966); see also Wiennzewski,
Application of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Individual Complaints,
in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 441 (F. Kalshoven & Y. Sandoz
eds. 1989)
125. S. ANDERSON, OMBuDSMAN PAPERS: AMERIeA EXPERIENCE AND PROPOSALS 7-10
(1969); Newman, Ombudsmen and Human Rights, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 951 (1969); Anderson,
Ombud Research: A Bibliographical Essay, 2 OMBUDSMAN J. 32 (1982).
126. Unlike international Ombudsmen, national offices generally have subpoena power.
However, becuse they have the power to compel testimony and evidence, they seldom have
to use it. See Gellhorn, Annotated Model Ombudsman Statute, § 18(c), in OMBUDSMEN FOR
AMERICAN GoVERO/NT. 172-73 (S. Anderson ed. 1968).
127. See H. TO.LEY, TE U.N. COMMISSION  HUMAN RIGHTs 23, 226 (1987).
128. Id. at 229.
129. Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners of War, Aug. 12,1949, U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see
ETuDEs ET EssAis SuR LE DRoIn INTERNATIONAL HumANITAutz El SuR LES PetNCPTS DE
LA CROIX-ROUGE aN L'HoNNEUR DE JEAN Picror [STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMANItA~.aN LAw AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RED CROSS IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET] (C.
Swinarski ed. 1984) [hereinafter ETUDES ET EssAIs].
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In exchange for the privilege of visitation, which provides an opportunity
for first-hand fact-finding, the ICRC has generally traded off the use of
publicity in "a tenuous working reconciliation between the pragmatic and
the idealistic facets of humanitarianism. in
Two prominent regions have established centralized courts to
adjudicate charges of human rights violations. First, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights establishes a European
Court of Human Rights to hear claims referred to it by the High Contract-
ing parties or by the European Commission of Human Rights.' Second,
the American Convention on Human Rights "makes interstate proceedings
optional and individual petitions compulsory for those states parties that
have accepted the jurisdiction of the [Inter-American] Court [of Human
Rights]."' In its first judgment against a member state, the Inter-Amer-
ican Court ordered Honduras to pay damages to the family of Angel
Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez, who disappeared in 1981.' The Court
based its judgment upon the finding of "a systematic, deliberate pattern of
selective disappearances carried out by a semi-clandestine unit of the
Honduran Armed Forces,"'
3
' constituting a failure "to provide meaning-
ful protection to all against violations of human rights . '. ..""'
Alongside these various tribunals, the process of reciprocal adjudica-
tion continues. Much of it takes place quietly, behind the scenes. A
highly visible manifestation may be seen in the public's condemnation of
the alleged use of poison gas by Iraq against her Kurdish population as a
violation of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol.
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In response to such
charges-if they are not ignored-the target country may either deny the
factual allegations or dispute their illegality. The Government of South
Africa tried to ignore the nearly universal condemnation of apartheid.'
130. Fryer, Book Review, 8 Hum. RTs. Q. 129 (1986) (reviewing ETUDES r ESSAis, supra
note 129).
131. European Convention, supra note 112, arts. 44, 47-48.
132. American Convention, supra note 111; C. GRAY, JuDiciAL REMEDIEs IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 149 (1987); see also Walsh, Protecting Citizensfrom Their Own Countries, 15
Hum. RTs. Q. 20 (1988).
133. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, INTwER-Am. C.H.R. 35, OAS/ser. L/VJIO.19, doc. 13
(1988).
134. Mendez, Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Judgment in the Case of Angel
Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 5 AIUSA LEGAL SUPPORi NErWORK NEWSL. 31
(1988).
135. Id. at 32.
136. See Galbraith & van lollen, Iraqi Chemical Weapons Use in Kurdistan, in HUMAN
RIGHTS READER 457 (W. Laquer & B. Rubin eds. 1990).
137. See Butcher, Legal Consequences for States of the Illegality of Apartheid, 8 Hum. RTs.
1991] HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 25
Iraq denied the use of chemical weapons.
13 
Israel disagrees with the
assertion that the Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War prohibits the expulsion of Palestinians from the occupied territories
on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The process of decentralized
adjudication is implicit in these exchanges and may also lead to proposals
for new legislation, as witnessed with regard to chemical weapons.
Private groups, such as Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists, have sprung up as volunteer Ombudsmen to
adjudge violations of human rights. While their legal right to demand
information is even less than that of nations or international organizations,
they are in a better position to use informal sources for fact-finding.
39
Furthermore, they are not hamstrung by the niceties of diplomatic protocol




What about enforcement? As already indicated, the unilateral threat
or use of force to impose sanctions has been outlawed.'
4
' Nations are
not legally entitled to take the law into their own hands. Only the Security




or a threat of economic or other sanctions,"
M but
normally there is no way to compel compliance through military coercion.
Q. 404, 404-07 (1986).
138, See Healy, House Votes for Iraq Sanctions: Joins Senate in Seeking Trade Curbs Over
Issue of Poison Gas, L.A. Times, Sept. 28, 1988, at 1, cl. 5.
139. See H. THOoLEN & B. VERSTAPPEN, HUMAN RIGHTS MISSIONS: A STUDY OF THE
FACT-FINDiNG PRACTICE OF NON-GovEuRNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONs (1986).
140. See AMNESTY INT'L, 1986 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT (1986); see also SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN REArTiONs AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGNTS FOR 1987, 1001 CONG., 2D Sess., (Jt. Comm. Print
1987).
141. See supra note 65.
142. After complaining about the kidnapping of Adolf Eichmarm in Argentina, the Argentine
government settled for an official apology from Israel, and the matter was declared closed. See
G. VON GLAN, supra note 21, at 278-79.
143. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14; see Meyer, U.S. Snub of World Court Won't Avert Day of Reckoning, L.A. Times,
Sept. 25, 1988, at 5, col. 2.
144. A simple but dramadc innovation has been suggested by David Caron, Iraq and the
Force of Law: Why Give a Shield ofimmunity?, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 89 (1991), who would have
the Security Council empower "all States to take appropriate measures so as to enable the
municipal courts to deny assertions of sovereign immunity." Id. at 91. This would permit
decentralired adjudication of claims brought by individual claimants. See E. Lutz, After the
Elections: Compensating Victims of Human Rights Abuses in NoW DIRECTIONS I  HUMAN
RIGHTS 195 (E. Lutz, H. Hannum, & K. Burke eds. 1989).
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Enforcement is decentralized and rests upon voluntary compliance. The
minimal outcome requested by the accusers is that the culprit stop breaking
the law. In the 1975 Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France; New
Zealand v. France), the International Court of Justice declared that the
disputes were moot when France stated by clear implication that she no
longer intended to carry out atmospheric tests in the South Pacific."
XII. CONCLUSION
While there has been a significant shift in the world constitution to
allow for the protection of individual human rights against a national's own
government, it would be illusory to claim that the problem of abuse is
under control. A body of human rights law presently exists, and an
attempt to expand this legal base by merely passing new laws would not
in itself accomplish effectuation. As a quick fix, mere enactment may be
only a conscience salver, if not an act of hypocrisy ("the tribute that vice
pays to virtue"). More legislation is not an adequate answer.
The great weakness in human rights law is the insufficiency of
centralized adjudication: "within international society there is no consis-
tently authoritative way to determine the existence of human rights
abuses."'" As a primitive legal system, with decentralized judging, it
suffers from this uncertainty.' 47 The lack of suitable tribunals is
exacerbated by the impediments to fact-finding. On-site inspection is a
growing phenomenon in international relations; it needs to be expanded and
made mandatory. The present structure of international law on the
legislative side has made the protection of human rights possible, but the
structural deficiencies on the adjudicatory side have frustrated implementa-
tion. We have not satisfied Carl Friedrich's test of effective regularized
restraint.
Except with regard to peacekeeping, as currently vis-A-vis Kuwait,
centralized enforcement is a dubious goal.' Do we want military
guarantees of human rights? Should the United Nations have invaded Iraq
to protect the Kurds; South Africa to liberate non-whites; China to shelter
145. See 1974-1975 I.CJ.Y.B. 111-15 (1975) ("Once the Court has found that a State has
entered into a commitment concerning its future conduct, it is not the Court's function to
contemplate that it will not comply with it.").
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dissidents; Israel to free Palestinians; the United States to succor native
Americans; or Chile, Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua to rescue prisoners
of conscience? Should the United States return to gunboat diplomacy in
the Caribbean? The cure may be worse than the malady. The difficulty,
which Great Britain experiences in Northern Ireland, counsels sobriety.
We teach by example. The use of violence breeds violence. United
Nations peacekeeping is more successful when it is not militant. The thin
blue line in Cyprus and the Middle East is not a conqueror but a trip-wire
and a symbol of peace, hence worthy of the Nobel Prize. We need
international intermediaries, not enforcers.
Human rights violations can be reduced by ameliorating the underlying
conflicts that engender them.1
4 
The Israelis should be pressured to
negotiate with the Palestinians and vice versa. Nations should encourage
Wilsonian self-determination, with all of its ambiguities and difficulties.
Force is rarely justifiable, and is not often effective even as a last resort.
There is no substitute for reasoned and other non-military persuasion. In
short, as long as the present nation-state system remains dominant, there
is no point in further centralizing the international enforcement function,
or in making General Assembly decisions or human rights comunittee
recommendations mandatory. We live in a primitive world and the current
status of international law reflects that primitivity.'
55 
Scientific advance
has outstripped improvements in social organization. We have walked a
few steps, but we have much farther to go. We should contemplate
radically different new worlds,' while fiddling with the one in which
we live. We cannot wait for major structural reform,"' but we can
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nudge the present tendencies. There is a self-fulfilling aspect to the belief
that it is possible to enhance human rights. Public and private agencies
should persevere. Military dictators may not have internalized the norms
of human rights law, but it is important that they know that others have
done so. Shame and ridicule are among the devices for enforcement in
decentralized legal systems.
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years to squander" on structural reforms before attacking concrete problems. Id.
153. See K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, supra note 6, at 264-69, for an explanation of the
role of "Public Opinion" as a juristic method, or of the law-ways whose art kept "a culture
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